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Abstract
Recent work in the growth literature has provided various explanations for transition delays
and the great divergence. This paper provides empirical support for one theory of transition
delays: initial land inequality. Our analysis is designed to elucidate the channels via which
land inequality can aﬀect long-run economic performance. Using a new historical data set
for land inequality (Frankema (2009)) we employ duration analysis to investigate whether
higher levels of land inequality lead to longer delays in the extension of primary schooling. We
then investigate whether such delays aﬀect long-run economic performance via their eﬀect on
contemporaneous schooling. Our ﬁndings suggest that land inequality is a key determinant of
delays in schooling, and that such delays have a signiﬁcant negative impact on long-run output.
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The transition from economic stagnation to growth and the associated phenomenon of the
great divergence has been the subject of intensive research in the growth literature. In
particular, there has been a large body of work that is concerned with the issue of economic
take-oﬀs. This work describes the transition of economies from a state of economic stagnation
to a modern industrial economy with positive growth rates. Notable examples include Galor
and Weil (2000), Hansen and Prescott (2001), and Desmet and Parente (2009).
Recent work in the growth literature has focused on the eﬀect of fundamental theories
(associated with slow moving determinants) such as geography and institutions on variations
in long-run economic performance across countries. We are interested in whether these
fundamental determinants are also important explanations for delays in countries achieving
economic take-oﬀs. Speciﬁcally, this paper focuses on the empirical support for one theory
of transition delays - initial land inequality.
Many researchers have highlighted the role that initial land inequality plays in terms of
delaying the onset of economic take-oﬀ. In particular, the theory has highlighted the deep
connection between land inequality and human capital accumulation. In Galor, Moav, and
Vollrath (2009), henceforth GMV, land inequality negatively aﬀects the implementation of
educational reforms that lead to the extension of educational opportunities to the general
population. In particular, due to the low complementarity of human capital and land (see
also, Galor and Moav (2006)), an increase in the level of human capital increases productivity
in industry more than the agricultural sector, causing a decrease in the returns to land and
a rise in wages. Consequently, political elites who initially derive most of their income
from land have no incentive to support educational reforms. However, since productivity
growth in the industrial sector outstrips that in the agricultural sector, the returns from
the capital holdings of political elites increase as a proportion of their total income as the
economy advances. Their objection to education reform therefore declines over time such
that a critical time is reached whereby human capital-enhancing policies (e.g., compulsory
schooling) are enacted.
While GMV posit a direct eﬀect of land inequality on transition delays, other work in the
literature also propose an indirect eﬀect whereby land inequality inﬂuences the evolution of
political institutions, and it is these institutions that then determine the delays in transition.
Parente and Prescott (2000), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2006), and Engerman
1and Sokoloﬀ (2002) have all pointed out the important role that land inequality plays in
determining the evolution of political institutions. The diﬀerence between these works and
that of GMV is the emphasis on an independent role for political institutions and their
persistence in determining delays in enacting human capital promoting initiatives. For
example, as Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2006) point out, if there are rents to staying
in power, then, the politically powerful landed aristocracy would have a strong incentive to
block the introduction of new technologies and institutions in order to protect their power
and proﬁts, delaying at the same time the industrialization process. The suggestion here
is that the autonomous nature of political institutions may require direct reforms to these
institutions in order for welfare enhancing outcomes to be achieved. In contrast, in GMV’s
framework, economic progress automatically leads to a shift in incentives faced by the elites,
and to their willingness to adopt human capital enhancing policies.
Our contribution in this paper is threefold. First, we ask the question of what factors
determine the delay of a country in achieving a particular educational threshold (e.g. 50%
primary schooling enrollment). Speciﬁcally, do higher levels of land inequality lead to longer
delays? We exploit a new historical data set for land inequality by Frankema (2009) to
investigate this question in the context of hazard rate models. This is a departure from
the standard empirical work that is carried out in the growth literature. Methodologically,
empirical work in the growth literature focuses on the eﬀects of various covariates on long-run
per capita income or growth. In this paper, we focus instead on a more direct prediction of
the theory - what are the eﬀects of various fundamental determinants on delay in schooling?
In addition, we explicitly address the issue of model uncertainty in investigating
how fundamental determinants, such as land inequality, aﬀect the extension of schooling
opportunities. Our analysis does not assume that the GMV theory is necessarily the true
one but rather it provides ﬁndings that are robust to alternative theories and their proxies.
More precisely, we employ a Bayesian model averaging technique that aggregates the ﬁndings
across diﬀerent plausible model speciﬁcations using the posterior evidence as weights for each
model; see for example Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Tan (2008).
Consistent with the theory proposed by GMV, we ﬁnd that increased levels of land
inequality lead to more delays in reaching the 50% primary schooling enrollment rate
threshold. This result is robust to variations in the speciﬁcation of the hazard model, and also
holds true for other primary schooling threshold levels that are consistent with a substantial
extension of schooling opportunities to the population. Interestingly, initial values of political
2institutions (as measured by an executive constraint variable) do not appear to be important
in determining delays in schooling.
Second, we explore the question of how delays in schooling aﬀect contemporaneous
measures of schooling and institutions. We ﬁnd strong evidence that historical delays in
achieving particular educational thresholds determine not only current schooling but also
current executive constraints. This evidence suggests an alternative channel for the eﬀect of
land inequality on long-run economic performance via schooling delays. Therefore, our third
contribution investigates whether schooling delays are transmitted to long-run income via
their eﬀect on current institutions and schooling. Like Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes,
and Shleifer (2004), our results suggest that the historical evolutionary path of human capital
is a fundamental determinant of long-run economic outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the econometric framework and
discusses our data and results for the hazard analysis. Next we investigate the potential
implications of our ﬁndings for current schooling, institutions, and income in Section 3.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Econometric framework
2.1 Implementation and data
We employ the static Cox (1972) proportional hazard (Cox-PH) model to study the
probability of the event that a country moves from a low education state to a high education
state. In GMV’s theory, these two states correspond to a state of economic stagnation and a
state of sustained economic growth, respectively. Higher hazard rates correspond to higher
risks of transitioning out of the low education/stagnation state therefore implying shorter
delays in the extension of schooling opportunities.
The Cox-PH model decomposes the hazard function into a part that depends on the
time already spent in stagnation and on a set of explanatory variables Xi. So we can write







3where λ0(t) is the time dependent part also known as the baseline hazard function. We
estimate (2.1) using a partial likelihood method. The Cox-PH model is a semi-parametric
model in the sense that while it makes no assumption about the form of the function λ0(t),
it assumes parametric form for the eﬀect of the predictors on the hazard.1
In terms of the data, we construct a historical dataset spanning from 1700 to 1995 for
a sample of 53 countries. A detailed description of the data and our sources is given in the
Data Appendix A1.
The dependent variable in this case is the delay in schooling, measured as the time it
takes for each country to ﬁrst reach a threshold level in primary schooling enrollment, minus
the time it took the ﬁrst country to pass that threshold. For example, the United States was
the ﬁrst country to pass the 50% primary school enrollment threshold in 1831. The reason
for constructing the delay variable as a measure that relates primary schooling enrollment
in one country relative to the ﬁrst country to pass the threshold is so as to overcome the left
censoring problem. Since all other countries achieve the threshold at later dates than the
ﬁrst country to do so, left censoring is eliminated. The threshold levels we consider have to
fulﬁll two conditions: (i) they have to be high enough to capture the GMV idea of a large
scale extension of public schooling opportunities to the population, and (ii) they have to be
low enough so that enough countries attain the level within the sample so that we do not
have too many instances of right censoring in the data.
The actual construction of the primary schooling data follows Comin and Hobijn (2004)
who construct historical primary schooling data for 23 industrialized countries, measured as
the number of students in primary school as a fraction of the population, in the age range 5-
14. We extend the primary schooling data set to a larger set of 53 countries for this analysis.
The number of students enrolled is taken from Banks (1999), while the population in the
age range 5-14 is taken from Mitchell (1998). Table 2 lists the countries in our sample.
We now discuss the set of explanatory variables, Xi. For our analysis to correspond
closely with the theory, we imagine that countries always existed, but have diﬀerent structural
characteristics and historical experiences that inﬂuence when they achieve a particular
threshold level in schooling. These factors then explain why a particular country experienced
a delay in schooling attainment vis-` a-vis the US experience. We think of these factors as
controlling for two kinds of country-speciﬁc heterogeneity.
1For robustness purposes we also investigated parametric methods such as the Exponential, Log Logistic,
and Weibull without ﬁnding substantial diﬀerences.
4The ﬁrst type of country-speciﬁc heterogeneity corresponds to factors that are invariant
to the particular political elites that are in power at the time when schooling policy decisions
are made. These factors largely correspond to country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects as well as the
time it took for the relevant political elites; that is, the political elites who would make policy
decisions about schooling and who would see these through, to come to power.
One reason why a country might have experienced a delay in schooling attainment vis-
` a-vis the US may be because of its colonial history. We do have information about whether
a country was historically a European colony. To the extent that we can think of the initial
conditions of a colony as being substantially inﬂuenced by the European metropolis, we can
control for country-speciﬁc heterogeneity by including colonial dummy variables (speciﬁcally,
whether a country was a British colony, a Spanish or Portuguese colony, a French colony, or
Other European colony).
Another reason why a country may take more time than the US to attain a particular
schooling threshold may be that the relevant elites took longer to attain power and therefore
control over schooling policies. To control for the variation in the time it took a country’s
elites to attain autonomy over policies relative to the US, we include an Independence variable
that measures the additional years it took for each country to declare independence relative to
the US, who declared independence in 1776. This variable takes the value zero for metropolis
countries, and positive integers for colonies.
We also control for the elites’ hold on power by including a measure of Political Instability
due to Miller (2011). The idea is that elites who cannot secure their hold on power may have
less ability to inﬂuence policy outcomes (or, alternatively, face diﬀerent incentives in enacting
particular policies) hence leading to variation in delays in achieving particular schooling
thresholds. Political Instability is measured as the average of the ﬁrst diﬀerences (in absolute
values) of the Polity2 variable from Polity IV. The Polity2 variable is a measure of the
degree of democracy in a country with a score of +10 representing most democratic and -10
signifying most autocratic. The averages of the ﬁrst diﬀerences are calculated as follows: for
colonies we average values of the (absolute) year-to-year changes in the Polity2 variable from
the year of independence to the year the colony achieves the schooling threshold, while for
non-colonies, we take the corresponding average values from the earliest available observation
until the year the country achieves the schooling threshold.
The second set of variables corresponds to factors that inﬂuence the incentives of political
5elites to extend primary schooling opportunities to the population according to the theory.
As detailed in the Introduction, our main aim is to investigate how land inequality aﬀects
the transition from economic stagnation to the sustained growth era, through the human
capital channel. To do so, we use land inequality data from Frankema (2009). The variable
is expressed in Gini coeﬃcients, and it is compiled on the basis of the decile distribution of
the total number of land holdings (farms), and the total amount of agricultural land (nation-
wide), excluding communal pastures and forests.2 Frankema (2009) distinguishes between
land holding and land property. The former concept refers to the disposable amount of land
per farm while the latter concept is generally more unequally distributed than land holdings,
depending on the share of land under tenure. As a result the distribution of land holdings
yields a lower bound for the ownership distribution. For our analysis, we use the earliest
available land Gini observation for each country.
One concern with using land Gini as a variable is that it may be proxying for other
forms of wealth or income inequality. Some forms of wealth inequality may in fact imply
dramatically diﬀerent theoretical outcomes from those of GMV. For example, if inequality
was a result of inequality in capital holdings and not of land holdings by elites, it may
be the case that elites would prefer higher levels of schooling for the population since
human capital is complementary to physical capital. However, if we fail to include a proxy
variable for capital holdings inequality then the estimates for the eﬀects of land inequality on
schooling outcomes are likely to be biased. Alternatively, the precise nature of the inequality
responsible for lower schooling levels may be misspeciﬁed. For example, land Gini may be
proxying for income inequality (instead of land inequality) which has also been shown to be
associated with poor education outcomes across countries. In fact, Goldin and Katz (1997)
ﬁnd evidence that supports this proposition for the case of the US. To safeguard against
these possibilities, we obtain data for the number of automobile registrations per person to
proxy for other forms of inequality not associated with land; see Goldin and Katz (1997)
and Galor, Moav, and Vollrath (2009), in the Cox PH model (2.1).
GMV also theorize that land abundance that would beneﬁt agriculture in the early
stages of development would lead the landowning elite to be more reluctant to enact human
capital enhancing policies that disproportionately beneﬁt capitalists and workers. We include
therefore a measure of land abundance, the log of arable land (absolute) in hectares, in 1700,




j=1 |zi − zj| / 2n2µ, where zi and zj are the
percentage shares of land of n deciles (n = 10) and µ = 1/n.
6and investigate whether more land abundance leads to greater delays in schooling.
GMV’s theory also requires that we control for other developmental diﬀerences between
countries. The reason is that for a given level of land inequality, all else equal, higher levels
of economic development corresponds to capital holdings constituting a larger proportion of
the asset portfolio of elites. Since elites in more developed economies would derive a higher
portion of their income from the industrial sector, they would be more willing to enact human
capital-friendly policies. We control for initial development diﬀerences between countries
using the log of GDP per capita (Initial Income; Maddison (2009)). For non-colonies, we
take the average of log GDP per capita values from the earliest possible data point until
1831, while for colonies, we use the data on independence day or, if this is unavailable, the
earliest data point after independence. We should note that in all cases, the income data
occurs prior to the country achieving the schooling threshold. The timing of the variable is
meant to capture the level of development that was relevant to the elites that are in power
at the time when schooling policies are enacted.
The main alternative theory for schooling delays, as noted in the Introduction, is political
institutions. We proxy initial political institutions using historical executive constraints data
from Polity IV (Initial Executive Constraints). This variable lies between zero and one, with
higher values indicating more constraints on the power of the executive. Similar to the Initial
Income variable above, we take the average of executive constraints values from the earliest
possible data point until 1831 for non-colonies and use the data on independence day or, if
unavailable, the earliest data point after independence for colonies. In all cases, the data for
executive constraints occurs prior to the country achieving the schooling threshold, and is
meant to capture the relevant degree of executive constraints that apply to elites empowered
to determine schooling outcomes.
Following the empirical growth literature, we also control for a set of new growth theories
that have potential implications for human capital accumulation. The ﬁrst such theory
argues that a detrimental climate may have negative eﬀects on human capital accumulation
(see, Sachs, Gallup, and Mellinger (1999)). We proxy climate using a variable (Tropics) which
measures the percentage of a country’s land area that is classiﬁed as tropical or subtropical.
Finally, another theory requires that we account for the eﬀects of ethnic heterogeneity on
delays in schooling. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) suggest that higher levels of ethnic
heterogeneity potentially result in political disagreements over the provision of public goods
(such as schooling), and its subsequent under-provision. To control for the eﬀect of ethnic
7heterogeneity on delays in schooling, we include a measure of ethnic fractionalization due to
Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003) in Xi.
Table 1 presents summary statistics while Table A1 of the Appendix provides a detailed
descriptions of all the variables.
2.2 Model averaging of hazard models
Standard duration analysis estimates a baseline PH-Cox model in equation (2.1), which is
closest to the theory in question and then reports a few robustness exercises that include some
additional controls. An alternative approach to evaluate the relative evidentiary support of
competing theories includes a large number of variables and those variables that prove to be
signiﬁcant are then rendered as the important determinants. This approach is often referred
as a ‘kitchen sink’ approach.
However, both approaches do not systematically address the problem of model
uncertainty and do not provide robust evidence but rather rely on strong priors of the
econometrician. As Brock and Durlauf (2001) and others have argued, the inherent open-
endedness of new growth theories presents unique challenges to researchers in exploring their
quantitative consequences on growth. Because the inclusion of one set of growth theories
says nothing about whether other possible growth theories should be included (or not) in
the model, growth researchers face substantial model uncertainty in their work. The fear is
that the inclusion or exclusion of growth variables may signiﬁcantly alter the conclusions one
had previously arrived at for, say, the eﬀect of land inequality on delays in schooling based
on a particular model in the model space. In this case, the model space refers to the set of
all possible models generated by the set of growth regressors, denoted by M = M1,...,MK.
How can we obtain robust conclusions about the eﬀect of land inequality in equation (2.1)
and more generally about the structural parameters θ that do not condition on the model
choice?
We do so by employing a Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) approach by constructing
estimates conditional not on a single model, but on a model space whose elements span an
appropriate range of determinants suggested by a large body of work. A number of recent
papers have documented the advantages of using BMA in constructing robust estimates
primarily in the context of the linear model. See for example, Brock and Durlauf (2001),
8Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001), Sala-i Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004), Durlauf,
Kourtellos, and Tan (2008), Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2008), and Ciccone and Jarocinski
(2010). Our BMA approach is closest to Volinsky, Madigan, Raftery, and Kronmal (1997)
who employ BMA in the context of Cox-PH models to study the risk factors for stroke.
Model averaging “integrates out” the uncertainty over models by taking the weighted
average of model-speciﬁc estimates, where the weights reﬂect the evidentiary support for
each model given the data, D, and which are constructed to be analogous to posterior model




b µ(θ|Mk,D)b µ(Mk|D)) (2.2)
where µ(θ|Mk,D) is the posterior distribution of θ given a particular model Mk, and µ(Mk|D)
is the posterior probability of model Mk. The former is a standard Bayesian object, which
does not have a closed form expressions in the case of Cox-PH models. Following Volinsky,
Madigan, Raftery, and Kronmal (1997) we approximate it by the maximum likelihood
estimator, b µ(θ|Mk,D) ≈ b µ(θ|Mk, b θMLE
k ,D).3
As for the model weights, b µ(Mk|D) we use the Bayes’ rule, so that each weight is the
product of the integrated likelihood of the data given a model, b µ(D|Mk), and the prior
probability for a model, µ(Mk):
b µ(Mk|D) ∝ b µ(θ|Mk)µ(Mk) (2.3)
As standard in the literature, we assume a uniform prior so that the prior probability
that any variable is included in the true model is taken to be 0.5. The integrated likelihood
of model Mk is approximated by the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), log b µ(D|Mk) =
log b µ(D|b θPLE
k ,Mk) − (p/2)logn + O(1), where n should be the total number of uncensored
cases.








k b µ(Mk|D), (2.4)
3This posterior refers to the following integral µ(θ|Mk,D) =
R
µ(θ|θk,Mk,D)µ(θk|Mk,D)dθk, where
µ(θ|θk,Mk,D) is the likelihood and µ(θk|Mk,D)dθk is the prior density of θk.
9where b θPLE
k is the partial likelihood estimator of each model Mk. We compute the

















where b V θ
D,k is the model-speciﬁc posterior variance of the partial likelihood estimator
estimator. The ﬁrst term in equation (2.5) is the average of the posterior variances within
models and the second term is the variance of the posterior means across models (i.e.
weighted average of the squared deviations of the model-speciﬁc from the model averaged
estimates).4 We also report the posterior probability of inclusion for each covariate, which
is the sum of the posterior probability of all the models for which that variable appears. It
is meant to capture the (posterior) probability that that covariate is in the true model after
looking at the data.
2.3 Hazard results for delay in schooling
We present our ﬁndings for the Cox PH model in equation (2.1) in Table 4. The dependent
variable, delay in schooling, is the time it takes for each country to ﬁrst reach 50% in primary
schooling enrollment, minus the time the ﬁrst country (the US, in this case) passed the 50%
threshold. We chose to focus on the 50% threshold for two reasons.
First, the 50% threshold level is an appropriate level as it is consistent with the GMV
idea of a substantial extension of schooling opportunities to the population. However, to
get a sense of the robustness of our ﬁndings, we also investigated various other schooling
threshold values ranging from 40% to 60% primary schooling threshold levels. The 50%
threshold level also turns out to be neither too high nor too low in the following sense.
When the threshold level is low (essentially for all threshold levels below 45%), almost all
countries successfully attain the threshold level with very little diﬀerence in the time it took
to do so, so that there is not enough variation in the data to properly identify the eﬀects
of land inequality on schooling delays. However, when the threshold level is high (above
55%), the number of right censored countries becomes large. Table 3 shows the countries
4Our approach can be viewed as a “hybrid” approach to model averaging in the sense that we mix
frequentist probability statements about observables given unobservables and Bayesian probability statement
about unobservables given observables. For a similar approach, see Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Tan (2011)
10that failed to reach various primary schooling enrollment threshold levels; i.e., countries that
are right censored. Right censoring reduces the observed variation in schooling delays, and
makes it diﬃcult to identify the eﬀects of land inequality on delays.5
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 4 present the results from our model averaging analysis.
The ﬁrst column shows the posterior probability that each of the covariates is included in
the true model for the hazard rate, while the second and third columns present the BMA
posterior means and standard errors for each covariate. The remaining six columns show,
respectively, the coeﬃcient estimate and standard error for each covariate for (i) the two
posterior mode models from the BMA analysis, and (ii) the largest model in the model
space considered in the BMA analysis. The two posterior mode models are very similar
(they diﬀer only in the inclusion/exclusion of Ethnic Fractionalization) and have posterior
model probabilities that are very close (0.22 and 0.20). Outside of these two models, the
other models in the model space have very low posterior probability, and are therefore not
reported. For example, the third best model in the model space has negligible posterior
model probability (0.076), and the largest model has posterior model probability of 0.000.
Our reason for reporting the results from the posterior mode and largest models is to
provide the reader with the ability to compare ﬁndings via model selection - using the best
models (in terms of posterior weights) or a low-bias model (at the cost of reduced eﬃciency)
with potentially many irrelevant covariates - with those obtained via model averaging (BMA).
Finally, we also note that the posterior means are interpreted as the marginal eﬀect of each
covariate on the risk of crossing the 50% primary schooling threshold. Therefore, positive
estimates imply that the marginal contribution of the corresponding covariate is to reduce
the delay in schooling for countries.
Our BMA results are consistent with the theoretical predictions of GMV. As GMV
argued, for given levels of economic progress, land inequality implies a higher reliance of
political elites on income derived from landholdings leading them to delay the implementation
of human capital enhancing policies, which primarily beneﬁt capitalists and workers.
Similarly, the greater the abundance of arable land, all else equal, the greater the importance
of agriculture in the elites’ portfolio, the higher their subsequent reliance on returns from
landholdings, and the greater their reluctance to expand schooling opportunities. However,
for given levels of land inequality and arable land, economic progress results in a rebalancing
5For conciseness, we only report full results for the 50% threshold. The results for threshold levels between
45% and 55% do not diﬀer substantively; see Table A2 in the Appendix.
11of the portfolio returns of landholding elites away from income derived from land holdings
to returns from capital holdings resulting in elites being more willing to extend schooling to
the population.
Consistent with the theory, we ﬁnd that higher levels of land inequality (higher values for
Land Gini), greater abundance of Arable Land, and lower Initial Income result in lower risks
of exceeding the 50% schooling threshold, thereby implying greater delays in the expansion
of schooling opportunities. More precisely, the posterior inclusion probabilities of Land Gini,
Arable Land, and Initial Income are all very high at 98.7%, 97.5%, and 100%, respectively
- well above the 50% prior inclusion probability. The corresponding posterior means for all
three variables are also strongly signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The BMA results are conﬁrmed
by the results from the posterior mode models as well as the largest model. Accounting for
model uncertainty by averaging across models delivers the same conclusions as doing so by
selecting (the best) models.
Table 4 also makes clear that it is inequality in land ownership speciﬁcally, and not other
(non-land) forms of inequality (as proxied for by Auto Registration) that is important in
determining schooling delays. The posterior inclusion probability for Auto Registration is
negligible at 7.2% and the posterior mean is not signiﬁcant. Auto Registration also does not
appear as a covariate in either of the two posterior mode models.
Two sets of factors that can be interpreted as country ﬁxed eﬀects are shown to be
strongly signiﬁcant. The ﬁrst is the delay in a country gaining independence relative to
the US. We ﬁnd, predictably, that countries that took more time to gain independence, so
that the relevant elites required more time to attain autonomous control over policies, also
faced longer delays in achieving an extension of schooling opportunities to the population,
all else equal. The posterior inclusion probability of the Independence variable is 100% and
signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Along with gaining autonomy over a country’s policies, the level
of Political Instability (elites’ hold over power) is also important (with posterior inclusion
probability of 100%) and highly signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Our BMA ﬁndings (consistent
with those of the other reported models) indicate that a greater degree of Political Instability,
all else equal, leads to longer delays in reaching the 50% schooling threshold. Finally, being
either a British colony or some other colony that is not French, Spanish, or Portuguese
results in a lower delay in achieving schooling take-oﬀ. The posterior inclusion probabilities
for the British colony and Other colony dummies are both very high at 94.9% and 100%,
respectively, and the corresponding coeﬃcient estimates are strongly signiﬁcant.
12None of the other growth theories appear to be either signiﬁcant or important (in
terms of posterior inclusion probabilities) explanations for delays in achieving the schooling
threshold. Importantly, the results in Table 4 make clear that there is no evidence that
initial institutions (as measured by Initial Executive Constraints) aﬀects schooling delays.
The posterior inclusion probability for Initial Executive Constraints is well below 50% at
16.1%, and the posterior mean is not signiﬁcant. Initial Executive Constraints also does not
appear in either of the posterior mode models.
In sum, our ﬁndings appear to provide strong support for the hypothesis that schooling
delays are entirely explained by variables suggested by GMVs theory.
3 Long-run implications of delays in take-oﬀs
3.1 Current institutions and schooling
We next turn to the question of whether land inequality has long-term implications for
economic performance via its inﬂuence on schooling delays. We do this in two steps. In this
section, we take the ﬁrst step by examining whether (historical) delays in the extension of
public schooling generate persistent outcomes in current schooling and current institutional
quality of a country. In the next section, we will take the next step and investigate the
inﬂuence of (historical) schooling delays on long-run per capita income via its eﬀect on the
(current) measures of schooling and institutional quality considered in this section.
There is general agreement in the literature that the processes of institutions and
schooling are highly persistent (see for example Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) and
Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004)). However, there is disagreement
over the the role of other historical factors in determining current institutions and schooling.
In a seminal paper, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) argued that the mortality
rate of European settlers in the colonies was the key factor that determined their decision
to settle. Since these early European colonizers were more likely to establish higher quality
institutions in lands in which they chose to settle, they thereby inﬂuenced the formation of
early institutions in the colonies. The eﬀect of these early institutions was thought to be
persistent, so that these initial/historical institutions became important determinants of the
current institutions of a country.
13However, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004), using a limited
schooling sample from 1960-2000, produced evidence that suggests an alternative channel
through which early European settlers inﬂuenced the development of subsequent institutions.
Glaeser et al suggest that what European colonizers brought with them to the colonies they
settled were not the institutions from their home countries, but rather the high levels of
human capital that they possessed. It is this early human capital that was responsible for
sustaining the quality of institutions of a country and allowed the latter to persist over time.
More recently, Gallego (2010) has argued for the reverse. Gallego considers human
capital accumulation to be a consequence of the development of democratic political
structures. He appends the story by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) by
hypothesizing that European colonizers who chose to settle in a location were more likely to
invest in human capital for their children and for the native population, while those who set
up extractive states would have very little reason to do so. Gallego ﬁnds that institutions
are responsible for current (as well as historical) schooling levels.
Our analysis of the inﬂuence of land inequality on long-run outcomes via its eﬀects
on schooling delays allows us to revisit the debate over the historical determinants of
current institutions and schooling. With the exception that our primarily interest is in
documenting the eﬀects of land inequality on contemporaneous outcomes, the perspective
we adopt is not very diﬀerent from the papers cited above. Diﬀerent levels of land inequality
resulted in variations in the delay in which countries achieved large scale extension of
schooling opportunities. If the process for schooling is persistent, then, we should ﬁnd
that current levels of schooling are inﬂuenced by historical delays in achieving particular
schooling thresholds. If human capital accumulation is required for sustaining high quality
of institutions, then, we should also observe that shorter delays in achieving particular
thresholds of human capital levels in the past should correlate with better quality institutions
now.
To address this question, we consider the regressions of current institutions, RT,i, and
current schooling, HT,i, in equations (3.1) and (3.2), respectively.
RT,i = µR + αRλi + Z
0
iβR + eR,i, (3.1)
14HT,i = µH + αHλi + Z
0
iβH + eH,i, (3.2)
We measure current institutions, RT,i, using average executive constraints over the
periods 1965- 1995 and 1985-1995. Our preferred measure for averages executive constraints
is the period 1985-95, which is the same period average that Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2001) use for their institutions measure, and therefore allows our work to be
more comparable with the ﬁndings in the existing literature. For robustness, we also include
results where executive constraints are averaged across the period 1965-95; that is, the
period of time after decolonization. Similarly, we measure current schooling, HT,i, using the
logarithm of average years of male secondary and higher school attainment over the periods
of 1965-95 and 1985-95.
Our key determinant of both current schooling and executive constraints is the log
hazard rate (Log Hazard), λi. The Log Hazard captures the eﬀect of schooling delays on
outcome variables and is deﬁned as λi = log(λ(t|Xi;θ)/λ0(t)) = X0
iθ, where θ is estimated
by the Cox regression in (2.1). Zi is a vector of additional exogenous control variables, which
includes initial values of Schooling and Executive Constraints, Colonial dummies, Tropics,
and Ethnic Fractionalization. We also includes proxies for a country’s legal system based on
British common law (Britcommon), or French civil law (Frecivil) due to La Porta, Lopez-de
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999). Legal origin, and in particular French civil law, has
been found to be an important determinant of both schooling and institutions; see Glaeser,
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). The
coeﬃcients αR and αH capture the eﬀect of delay in schooling on current institutions and
current schooling, respectively, while eR,i and eH,i are regression error terms.
Tables 5 and 6 present the results for current Schooling and current Institutions,
respectively, over the periods 1965-95 and 1985-95. We focus on the 1985-95 results and
contrast them with the 1965-95 results when there is substantive disagreements between the
two ﬁndings. We present model averaging (2SLS-BMA) results, the posterior mode model,
as well as the largest model in the model space. We should note that the BMA methodology
here diﬀers from that employed in Section 2.3 in that the model averaging estimates refer to
weighted sums of 2SLS estimates rather than PLE estimates.6
62SLS-BMA has been proposed by Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Tan (2011) in the context of just identiﬁcation
and extended to the case of over identiﬁcation by Eicher, Lenkoski, and Raftery (2009).
15There are two main ﬁndings for current Schooling. First, there is no evidence that
initial institutions is an important determinant of current Schooling once we control for Log
Hazard. The posterior inclusion probability of Initial Executive Constraints from the BMA
analysis is far below the 50% prior at 16.5% for the 1985-95 period, and the posterior mean
is not signiﬁcant. The posterior mode model in this exercise has posterior model probability
of 11.8% which is slightly more than twice as large as that for the next best model (at 5.2%).
Nevertheless, a posterior model probability of 11.8% is not large, and therefore we prefer the
BMA results. In any case, Initial Executive Constraints does not appear in the posterior
mode model. Second, the only determinant that is both an important (in terms of posterior
inclusion probability) as well as a signiﬁcant determinant of current Schooling is the Log
Hazard. The posterior inclusion probability for Log Hazard is 100% and the posterior mean
is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Hence, land inequality appears to exert a strong inﬂuence on
current Schooling via its eﬀect on the (historical) delay in schooling.
The main ﬁnding for current Executive Constraints is that both initial institutions and
schooling delays appear to be important determinants. The posterior inclusion probabilities
for both Initial Executive Constraints and Log Hazard are high at 98.6% and 89.7%,
respectively. However, for the 1985-95 period, the posterior mean for Initial Executive
Constraints is signiﬁcant at the 5% level while that for Log Hazard is not signiﬁcant. This
result for the posterior mean for Log Hazard, however, appears to be conﬁned to the 1985-95
BMA exercise. The corresponding posterior mean for the 1965-95 period is signiﬁcant at
the 5% level. Also, Log Hazard is a variable that is included in the posterior mode models
in both the 1985-95 and 1965-95 exercises. In both these cases, the posterior mean for Log
Hazard is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Nevertheless, in both exercises, the evidence for the
posterior mode model relative to other models in the model space was not overwhelming,
and hence we continue to rely on the evidence from the BMA exercises, which, as we saw,
turns out to be ambiguous across the two periods for Log Hazard.
Our analysis highlights the importance of land inequality in inﬂuencing both current
institutions and schooling through the former’s impact on delaying the extension of schooling
opportunities. In particular, our ﬁndings agree with both Acemoglu et al and Glaeser et
al. Early institutions do play a critical role in determining current institutions, but so do
the initial conditions surrounding early human capital accumulation. However, at least for
the sample of countries we have, we do not ﬁnd evidence for an important role of early
institutions in determining current human capital levels. The main explanation for the
16variation of current human capital levels appears to be variations in the ability of countries
to substantially extend schooling opportunities early on in the development process. The
main determinant of delays in reaching early schooling milestones is the inequality of land
ownership.
3.2 Long-run economic performance
We now extend the analysis in the previous section to investigate the implications of schooling
delays on long-run economic performance. The results from the previous section suggest
that this would be accomplished through both the current schooling and current institutions
channels. To facilitate our analysis, we employ the canonical cross-country income regression
framework along the lines of Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson
(2001), and Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004), which is standard in
the growth literature. This regression is given by equation (3.3) that takes the form of a
linear regression of log GDP per capita in 1995 on current institutions, RT,i, schooling, HT,i,
and other factors, Zi that include Tropics, Ethnic Fractionalization, and colonial dummies,
yT,i = µy + αyRT,i + βyHT,i + Z
0
iγy + ey,i, (3.3)
Our identiﬁcation strategy exploits the variation in the cross-country distribution of
land inequality and its eﬀect on the delay of the extension of public schooling. As put forth
by Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2002) and GMV, variations in initial climatic conditions are
responsible for the distribution of land inequality. In areas where conditions are conducive
for the cultivation of large scale crops, land ownership tends to be concentrated in the
hands of a small group of elites. However, in areas where only small holdings are possible,
land ownership tends to be more dispersed. We posit that the historical inequality of land
ownership would not constitute a direct determinant of long-run income. To the extent
that we can conceive of climatic conditions as being randomly assigned to countries, we
are then able, in the spirit of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), to assume our
key exclusion restriction. However, as argued in the previous section, land inequality can
assert an inﬂuence over long-run income via its eﬀect on schooling delays, which in turn
aﬀects contemporaneous determinants of current income, such as current institutions and
schooling. We therefore instrument current Schooling with the Log Hazard.
17The ﬁrst strategy we pursue is to employ the Log Hazard and Initial Executive
Constraints as instruments for current Schooling and current Executive Constraints,
respectively. Table 7 presents our main ﬁndings for the two alternative periods: 1965-95 and
1985-95. Panel A shows BMA-2SLS results, which include the posterior inclusion probability
of each variable, as well as the corresponding posterior mean and posterior standard error.
We also present results for the posterior mode model as well as the largest model. Panel B
presents the ﬁrst-stage results.
The ﬁrst stage results conﬁrm that the Log Hazard and Initial Executive Constraints
are good instruments for current Schooling and current Executive Constraints. In the ﬁrst
stage regression of current Executive Constraints, Initial Executive Constraints is strongly
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This is true for both time periods. Similarly, the Log Hazard is
also strongly signiﬁcant at the 1% level for both time periods in the ﬁrst stage regression
for current Schooling. Finally, note that in all cases the F-statistics are well above 10 that
suggest that our instruments are not weak.
In the second stage current income regression, for both time periods, we ﬁnd that both
current Executive Constraints and current Schooling are important determinants of long-run
income. The posterior inclusion probability for both these variables are very high at close
to 100%. However, while both the current Executive Constraints and current Schooling
are very likely to be variables in the true model, once we account for model uncertainty,
only current Schooling turns out to have a (highly) signiﬁcant impact (at the 1% level) on
long-run income. Our ﬁndings suggest, therefore, that land inequality has an ultimate and
important inﬂuence on long-run income via the human capital channel.
The second strategy employs the same income regression as above, but accounts for
both second stage and ﬁrst stage model uncertainty along the lines of Eicher, Lenkoski,
and Raftery (2009). In particular, we instrument current Executive Constraints and current
Schooling using the full set of historical determinants from Tables 5 and 6 to compute the
2SLS-BMA estimates. We report the results from this over-identiﬁed exercise in Table 9.
Panel A of Table 9 conﬁrms that the results we obtained for the just-identiﬁed case in Table
7 for Schooling are robust to the inclusion of additional instruments. As in the latter case,
the posterior inclusion probabilities for Schooling are close to 100% for both time periods.
The posterior means are also always strongly signiﬁcant at the 1% level. However, the
ﬁndings for current Executive Constraints are signiﬁcantly weakened from before. Now,
current Executive Constraints is found to be a far less important determinant of current
18income. Its posterior inclusion probability has dropped from close to 100% in Table Table
7 to 48.9% and 67.1% for the periods 1965-95 and 1985-95, respectively. Its posterior mean
remains insigniﬁcant for both periods.
As a further robustness check, we also report results that drop current Schooling from the
model space. These results are reported in Table 7 and Table 9 (Panel A), and correspond
to those in Tables 8 and 9 (Panel B), respectively. This exercise provides a check that
we are able to verify the existing results in the literature (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2001) and Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004)) that ﬁnd
a major role for institutional quality in determining cross-country diﬀerences in economic
development. For example, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) was able to do so using
log settler mortality to instrument for current institutions. Unfortunately, we could not use
the preferred instrument of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) because it severely
restricts our sample. However, when we drop current Schooling from the income regression
(3.3), we ﬁnd that current Executive Constraints is an important and highly signiﬁcant
determinant of long-run income. This result is consistent with the ﬁndings in the existing
literature and is, therefore, precisely what we expected to ﬁnd.
In terms of the other growth determinants, we ﬁnd that British Colony negatively aﬀects
income at the 1% signiﬁcant level and with a posterior inclusion probability of 1. This ﬁnding
is consistent with the ﬁndings of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). As pointed out
by Acemoglu et al, a possible explanation for the negative eﬀect of British Colony on income
is that researchers are overestimating the negative quality of institutions for French colonies,
and the second-stage eﬀect of British colony is correcting for this. We also ﬁnd that Ethnic
Fractionalization and Tropics are not robust determinants of long-run economic performance.
Interestingly, when we consider the eﬀect of Schooling the posterior inclusion probability of
Tropics is always below 50% with a negative but insigniﬁcant eﬀect (see Tables 7 and 9).
However, when we do not consider the eﬀect of Schooling (see Table 9), Tropics appears
to play an important role with posterior inclusion probability of 97.1% and 91.1% and a
negative and strongly signiﬁcant eﬀect at the 1% and 5% levels, for the periods of 1965-95
and 1985-95, respectively. Our reading of this result is that Tropics is masking the correlation
of geography with land inequality, which in turn is the key determinant of schooling in the
ﬁrst stage.
Overall, our ﬁndings highlight the important role that human capital accumulation plays
in determining long-run economic performance. Since land inequality has been shown to be
19a key factor in determining human capital accumulation, it is therefore a crucial fundamental
determinant of economic outcomes.
4 Conclusion
This paper accomplishes three things. First, we investigate the direct predictions of the
theory of Galor, Moav, and Vollrath (2009) (GMV) that higher levels of land inequality result
in delays in the implementation of human capital enhancing policies. Using new historical
data by Frankema (2009), we test the importance of land inequality as a determinant of delays
in the extension of schooling opportunities against alternatives theories. We ﬁnd strong
evidence to conﬁrm GMV’s predictions. Next, we examine the eﬀect of schooling delays
on contemporaneous determinants of long-run income; speciﬁcally, current institutions and
human capital formation. Our ﬁndings suggest new channels through which land inequality
potentially aﬀects long-run economic performance. Finally, we contribute to the ongoing
debate in the growth literature over whether it is the historical level of human capital or
the historical quality of institutions that is ultimately responsible for long-run economic
performance. While our ﬁndings do not allow us to assert the primacy of either of these deep
determinants, they do suggest a stronger role for human capital. We certainly do not ﬁnd
evidence to support the hypothesis that initial institutions determine current schooling levels
(which then aﬀect long-run income). Rather, our work concludes that it is land inequality
and the incentives it provides to elites to delay the extension of schooling opportunities that
ultimately results in the failure of countries to launch economically through the eﬀects of
schooling delays on both current schooling levels and quality of institutions.
20Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics for the 53 countries of our dataset.
Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Initial Income 7.010 0.482 6.116 8.583
Income in 1995 8.525 1.016 6.452 10.11
Initial Schooling 0.378 0.229 0.000 0.910
Schooling, 1965-95 0.298 0.794 -2.291 1.685
Schooling, 1985-95 0.643 0.702 -2.034 1.790
Initial Executive Constraints 0.370 0.399 0.000 1.000
Executive constraints, 1965-95 0.570 0.341 0.000 1.000
Executive constraints, 1985-95 0.686 0.309 0.000 1.000
Political Instability 0.278 0.385 0.000 2.375
Auto Registration 0.037 0.106 0.000 0.752
Land Gini 0.636 0.144 0.307 0.863
Arable Land 6.934 1.573 3.367 11.27
Independence 84.00 73.10 0.000 199.0
Tropics 0.376 0.417 0.000 1.000
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.373 0.247 0.012 0.859
Frecivil 0.528 0.504 0.000 1.000
Britcommon 0.327 0.474 0.000 1.000
British Colony 0.302 0.463 0.000 1.000
French Colony 0.057 0.233 0.000 1.000
Span./Port Colony 0.302 0.463 0.000 1.000
Other Colonies 0.113 0.320 0.000 1.000
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1Table 2: List of Countries
This table presents the list of countries. In the bracket we note the date of the actual starting date of each country.
Europe Sub-Saharan East Asia and Paciﬁc
Austria (1919) Argentina (1895) Algeria (1962)
Belgium (1860) Brazil (1872) Egypt (1951)
Denmark (1882) Chile (1895) Iran (1887)
France (1851) Colombia (1938) Iraq (1957)
Greece (1870) Costa Rica (1883) Morocco (1956)
Ireland (1926) Dom. Rep (1844) Tunisia (1956)
Netherlands (1899) Ecuador (1950)
Norway (1855) El Salvador (1930) South Asia
Portugal (1864) Guatemala (1950) India (1947)
Romania (1899) Honduras (1930) Pakistan (1961)
Sweden (1882) Nicaragua (1950) Sri Lanka (1948)
UK (1860) Panama (1950)
Paraguay (1950) Central Asia
Oﬀshoots Peru (1961) Turkey (1935)
Australia (1946)
Canada (1865) East Asia and Paciﬁc
N. Zealand (1907) China (1953)
USA (1830) Indonesia (1961)
Japan (1815)
Sub-Saharan Korea Rep. (1960)
Ghana (1960) Malaysia (1957)
Kenya (1969) Myanmar (1948)
Mozambique (1975) Philippines (1948)
South Africa (1946) Thailand (1929)
Zambia (1969)
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2Table 3: Primary Schooling Threshold Failure
This table lists the countries that attain the primary schooling for various thresholds
40% 45% 50% 55% 60% 65% 70%
Morocco India Egypt Egypt Egypt China Algeria
Pakistan Morocco India Guatemala Ghana Colombia China
Pakistan Morocco India Guatemala Egypt Colombia
Mozambique Iraq Honduras Ghana Costa Rica
Pakistan Morocco India Guatemala Egypt
Mozambique Iran Honduras El Salvador
Myanmar Iraq India Ghana
Nicaragua Morocco Iran Greece
Pakistan Mozambique Iraq Guatemala
















3Table 4: Hazard Model for the Delay in Primary Schooling
The table presents BMA results for the Cox-PH duration model. The posterior inclusion probability (PIP) of a variable is the sum of the
posterior probabilities models that include that variable. The posterior mean (PM) is the average of the partial likelihood coeﬃcient estimates
(COEF) of individual models weighted by posterior probability. The posterior standard error (PSE) is the BMA estimate for the standard
error (SE) taking model uncertainty into account. All reported standard errors refer to heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
Model Averaging Posterior Mode Models Largest Model
PIP PM PSE COEF SE COEF SE SE COEF
Initial Income 100.0 1.430 0.470 1.456 0.390 1.423 0.400 1.490 0.646
Land gini 98.7 -6.600 2.100 -6.844 1.924 -6.857 2.156 -6.224 2.098
Arable Land 97.5 -0.420 0.160 -0.422 0.125 -0.424 0.137 -0.440 0.151
British Colony 94.9 2.170 0.910 2.307 0.613 2.283 0.621 2.415 1.126
Span./Port. Colony 10.9 -0.050 0.260 - - - - -0.350 0.861
French Colony 17.5 0.250 0.740 - - - - 1.329 1.341
Other Colonies 100.0 2.670 0.780 2.623 0.644 2.662 0.630 3.136 0.911
Independence 100.0 -0.020 0.010 -0.024 0.005 -0.023 0.004 -0.028 0.007
Political Instability 100.0 -2.390 0.880 -2.313 0.741 -2.576 0.823 -2.409 0.869
Initial Executive Constraints 16.1 0.150 0.500 - - - - 0.578 0.747
Tropics 13.7 -0.070 0.260 - - - - 0.226 0.827
Ethnic Fractionalization 39.0 -0.540 0.830 - - -1.411 0.698 -1.290 0.827
Auto Registration 7.2 -0.010 0.470 - - - - -0.462 1.160
Wald statistic 42.79 41.02 50.51
Posterior Model Probabality 0.220 0.199 0.000
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4Table 5: Historical Determinants of Current Schooling
The table presents 2SLS-BMA results for average schooling for the periods 1965-95 and 1985-95. The posterior inclusion probability (PIP) of
a variable is the sum of the posterior probabilities models that include that variable. The posterior mean (PM) is the average of the coeﬃcient
estimates (COEF) of individual models weighted by posterior probability. The posterior standard error (PSE) is the BMA estimate for the
standard error (SE) taking model uncertainty into account. All reported standard errors refer to heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
Panel A: Schooling in 1965-1995
Model Averaging Posterior Mode Largest
PIP PM PSE COEF SE COEF SE
Constant 100.0 0.476 0.360 0.502 0.329 0.612 0.294
British Colony 15.9 -0.003 0.175 - - 0.272 0.475
Span./Port Colony 21.6 0.043 0.239 - - 0.218 0.377
French Colony 28.1 -0.141 0.529 - - -0.429 0.758
Other Colonies 26.2 0.087 0.257 - - 0.298 0.377
Initial Exec. Constraints 17.5 0.033 0.212 - - 0.255 0.508
Initial Schooling 31.7 0.151 0.388 - - 0.366 0.550
Log Hazard 100.0 0.207 0.102 0.223 0.102 0.160 0.093
Frecivil 81.2 -0.353 0.362 -0.375 0.331 -0.542 0.339
Britcommon 19.3 -0.042 0.217 - - -0.533 0.582
Tropics 97.9 -0.616 0.366 -0.592 0.379 -0.696 0.286
Ethnic Fractionalization 22.6 -0.086 0.334 - - -0.381 0.571
Panel B: Schooling in 1985-1995
Model Averaging Posterior Mode Largest
PIP PM PSE COEF SE COEF SE
Constant 100.0 0.752 0.312 0.817 0.287 0.883 0.274
British Colony 15.4 0.006 0.148 - - 0.245 0.444
Span./Port Colony 18.3 -0.013 0.170 - - 0.108 0.350
French Colony 14.6 -0.027 0.320 - - -0.133 0.700
Other Colonies 25.4 0.069 0.204 - - 0.284 0.334
Initial Exec. Constraints 16.5 0.023 0.166 - - 0.164 0.442
Initial Schooling 28.2 0.114 0.319 - - 0.284 0.502
Log Hazard 100.0 0.185 0.090 0.193 0.090 0.149 0.088
Frecivil 62.4 -0.198 0.275 -0.286 0.280 -0.397 0.300
Britcommon 16.6 -0.017 0.160 - - -0.407 0.499
Tropics 97.4 -0.550 0.318 -0.559 0.316 -0.581 0.264
Ethnic Fractionalization 21.3 -0.071 0.288 - - -0.327 0.526
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5Table 6: Historical Determinants of Current Institutions
The table presents 2SLS-BMA results for average executive constraints for the periods 1965-95 and 1985-95. The posterior inclusion probability
(PIP) of a variable is the sum of the posterior probabilities models that include that variable. The posterior mean (PM) is the average of
the coeﬃcient estimates (COEF) of individual models weighted by posterior probability. The posterior standard error (PSE) is the BMA
estimate for the standard error (SE) taking model uncertainty into account. All reported standard errors refer to heteroskedasticity consistent
standard errors.
Panel A: Executive Constraints in 1965-1995
Model Averaging Posterior Mode Largest
PIP PM PSE COEF SE COEF SE
Constant 100.0 0.503 0.152 0.514 0.110 0.600 0.175
British Colony 33.8 -0.075 0.163 - - -0.080 0.188
Span./Port Colony 17.4 0.003 0.076 - - -0.009 0.182
French Colony 66.5 -0.270 0.317 -0.433 0.295 -0.443 0.273
Other Colonies 30.5 -0.051 0.119 - - -0.182 0.200
Initial Exec. Constraints 98.9 0.502 0.251 0.566 0.234 0.597 0.197
Initial Schooling 13.3 0.006 0.097 - - 0.080 0.227
Log Hazard 99.3 0.071 0.035 0.064 0.031 0.055 0.031
Frecivil 30.1 -0.040 0.111 - - -0.110 0.186
Britcommon 55.7 -0.184 0.243 -0.304 0.193 -0.366 0.238
Tropics 69.3 -0.141 0.155 -0.228 0.137 -0.201 0.138
Ethnic Fractionalization 15.4 -0.015 0.114 - - -0.013 0.242
Panel B: Executive Constraints in 1985-1995
Model Averaging Posterior Mode Largest
PIP PM PSE COEF SE COEF SE
Constant 100.0 0.694 0.114 0.696 0.087 0.755 0.138
British Colony 31.2 -0.086 0.174 - - -0.066 0.165
Span./Port Colony 15.5 0.007 0.053 - - 0.070 0.140
French Colony 90.7 -0.452 0.262 -0.506 0.226 -0.481 0.217
Other Colonies 17.5 -0.016 0.069 - - -0.048 0.158
Initial Exec. Constraints 98.6 0.528 0.207 0.555 0.188 0.548 0.161
Initial Schooling 13.9 0.008 0.075 - - 0.033 0.178
Log Hazard 89.7 0.044 0.027 0.046 0.021 0.039 0.021
Frecivil 17.6 -0.013 0.064 - - -0.086 0.156
Britcommon 76.9 -0.341 0.248 -0.449 0.160 -0.411 0.200
Tropics 78.7 -0.164 0.126 -0.210 0.101 -0.211 0.093
Ethnic Fractionalization 19.4 -0.030 0.113 - - -0.069 0.202
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6Table 7: Long-run Income Regression: including schooling (just identiﬁcation)
The table presents 2SLS-BMA results for log per capita income in 1995 using ﬁtted Log Hazard and Initial Executive Constraints as instruments for current schooling
and executive constraints, respectively. The posterior inclusion probability (PIP) of a variable is the sum of the posterior probabilities models that include that
variable. The posterior mean (PM) is the average of the coeﬃcient estimates (COEF) of individual models weighted by posterior probability. The posterior standard
error (PSE) is the BMA estimate for the standard error (SE) taking model uncertainty into account. All reported standard errors refer to heteroskedasticity consistent
standard errors. Panel B presents the ﬁrst stage results for both Executive Constraints and Schooling for 1965-95 and 1985-1995.
Panel A: Second stage results
Model Averaging Posterior Mode Largest Model Averaging Posterior Mode Largest
PIP PM PSE COEF SE COEF SE PIP PM PSE COEF SE COEF SE
Constant 100.0 8.031 0.269 8.079 0.249 7.815 0.303 100.0 7.292 0.290 7.272 0.294 7.030 0.342
British Colony 100.0 -0.681 0.132 -0.679 0.118 -0.770 0.215 100.0 -0.539 0.155 -0.531 0.149 -0.678 0.212
Span./Port Colony 14.2 -0.004 0.076 - - 0.033 0.226 13.1 -0.001 0.085 - - -0.015 0.212
French Colony 9.1 0.042 0.148 - - 0.546 0.280 8.5 0.024 0.110 - - 0.355 0.260
Other Colonies 14.8 -0.016 0.113 - - -0.112 0.300 17.7 -0.042 0.159 - - -0.272 0.269
Exec. Con., 1965-95 99.8 0.810 0.559 0.829 0.552 0.802 0.540 - - - - - - -
Schooling, 1965-95 100.0 0.982 0.287 0.945 0.298 1.116 0.341 - - - - - - -
Exec. Con., 1985-95 - - - - - - - 99.7 1.033 0.606 1.009 0.606 1.104 0.595
Schooling, 1985-95 - - - - - - - 99.7 1.127 0.346 1.146 0.317 1.244 0.400
Tropics 48.9 -0.102 0.198 -0.212 0.232 -0.163 0.288 35.4 -0.061 0.180 - - -0.129 0.283
Ethnic Fractionalization 4.6 0.018 0.115 - - 0.582 0.359 3.5 0.015 0.110 - - 0.608 0.384
Panel B: First stage results
1965-95 1985-95
Exec.Con. Schooling Exec.Con. Schooling
COEF SE COEF SE COEF SE COEF SE
Constant 0.555 0.082 0.451 0.157 0.706 0.087 0.768 0.138
British Colony -0.310 0.139 0.047 0.261 -0.342 0.145 0.072 0.211
Span./Port Colony -0.046 0.094 -0.087 0.176 0.049 0.080 -0.112 0.147
French Colony -0.464 0.088 -0.639 0.188 -0.491 0.107 -0.283 0.159
Other Colonies -0.180 0.089 0.151 0.230 -0.038 0.099 0.182 0.204
Initial Exec. Con. 0.524 0.127 0.245 0.252 0.457 0.135 0.152 0.200
Log Hazard 0.063 0.016 0.193 0.043 0.045 0.017 0.174 0.042
Tropics -0.180 0.087 -0.597 0.170 -0.193 0.078 -0.509 0.146
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.037 0.162 -0.495 0.278 -0.088 0.150 -0.411 0.269
F-stat 36.01 25.78 17.18 28.85
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7Table 8: Long-run Income Regression: excluding schooling (just identiﬁcation)
The table presents 2SLS-BMA results for log per capita income in 1995 using initial institutions as instrument for current institutions. The posterior inclusion
probability (PIP) of a variable is the sum of the posterior probabilities models that include that variable. The posterior mean (PM) is the average of the coeﬃcient
estimates (COEF) of individual models weighted by posterior probability. The posterior standard error (PSE) is the BMA estimate for the standard error (SE)
taking model uncertainty into account. All reported standard errors refer to heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Panel B presents the ﬁrst stage results for
Executive constraints for 1965-95 and 1985-1995.
Panel A: Second stage results
Model Averaging Posterior Mode Largest Model Averaging Posterior Mode Largest
PIP PM PSE COEF SE COEF SE PIP PM PSE COEF SE COEF SE
Constant 100.0 8.038 0.260 8.002 0.241 8.194 0.331 100.0 7.600 0.374 7.552 0.351 7.755 0.449
British Colony 100.0 -0.704 0.189 -0.717 0.176 -0.636 0.244 99.9 -0.461 0.228 -0.448 0.211 -0.498 0.241
Span./Port Colony 16.8 -0.031 0.112 -0.087 0.245 25.7 -0.081 0.182 -0.276 0.227
French Colony 12.8 -0.016 0.107 -0.191 0.291 12.3 0.007 0.118 -0.042 0.340
Other Colonies 20.0 0.058 0.157 0.243 0.269 14.6 0.018 0.128 0.009 0.318
Exec. Con., 1965-95 100.0 1.865 0.339 1.892 0.333 1.752 0.353
Exec. Con., 1985-95 - - - - - 100.0 2.114 0.426 2.132 0.416 2.066 0.453
Tropics 98.9 -0.820 0.237 -0.852 0.204 -0.763 0.272 98.2 -0.837 0.263 -0.907 0.202 -0.692 0.289
Ethnic Fractionalization 20.3 -0.085 0.237 -0.427 0.363 21.8 -0.093 0.264 -0.368 0.401
Panel B: First stage results
1965-95 1985-95
Exec.Con. Exec.Con.
COEF SE COEF SE
Constant 0.718 0.082 0.822 0.072
British Colony -0.397 0.163 -0.404 0.162
Span./Port Colony -0.073 0.105 0.030 0.090
French Colony -0.652 0.081 -0.625 0.089
Other Colonies -0.174 0.112 -0.034 0.111
Initial Exec. Con. 0.616 0.144 0.522 0.140
Tropics -0.223 0.100 -0.223 0.080
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.237 0.166 -0.229 0.146
F-stat 19.45 13.86
2
8Table 9: Long-run Income Regression (over identiﬁcation)
The table presents 2SLS-BMA results for log per capita income in 1995 using an over-identiﬁcation strategy based on the results in Tables 6 and 5 as the ﬁrst stage.
Panel A presents the results when we account for the eﬀect of both current schooling and executive constraints while Panel B presents the results for the case when
we exclude the eﬀect of current schooling. The posterior inclusion probability (PIP) of a variable is the sum of the posterior probabilities models that include that
variable. The posterior mean (PM) is the average of the coeﬃcient estimates (COEF) of individual models weighted by posterior probability. The posterior standard
error (PSE) is the BMA estimate for the standard error (SE) taking model uncertainty into account. All reported standard errors refer to heteroskedasticity consistent
standard errors.
Panel A: Including Schooling
Model Averaging Posterior Mode Largest Model Averaging Posterior Mode Largest
PIP PM PSE COEF SE COEF SE PIP PM PSE COEF SE COEF SE
Constant 100.0 8.112 0.320 8.361 0.117 7.830 0.243 100.0 7.334 0.374 7.161 0.218 7.066 0.280
British Colony 99.5 -0.691 0.162 -0.659 0.148 -0.740 0.199 96.0 -0.529 0.193 -0.525 0.140 -0.548 0.203
Span./Port Colony 14.1 0.011 0.091 - - 0.065 0.226 14.6 0.014 0.101 - - 0.012 0.218
French Colony 13.0 0.003 0.124 - - 0.090 0.312 15.5 0.012 0.159 - - 0.210 0.245
Other Colonies 12.5 -0.003 0.103 - - 0.027 0.252 13.5 -0.012 0.123 - - -0.105 0.292
Exec. Con, 1965-95 48.9 0.599 0.738 - - 1.309 0.421 - - - - - - -
Schooling, 1965-95 97.2 1.093 0.337 1.322 0.129 0.794 0.257 - - - - - - -
Exec. Con, 1985-95 - - - - - - - 67.1 0.809 0.675 1.133 0.402 1.400 0.481
Schooling, 1985-95 - - - - - - - 99.9 1.270 0.304 1.181 0.236 1.061 0.315
Tropics 24.5 -0.081 0.201 - - -0.363 0.263 16.6 -0.032 0.132 - - -0.200 0.283
Ethnic Fractionalization 13.3 0.018 0.137 - - 0.175 0.335 13.4 0.015 0.148 - - 0.185 0.370
Panel B: Excluding Schooling
Model Averaging Posterior Mode Largest Model Averaging Posterior Mode Largest
PIP PM PSE COEF SE COEF SE PIP PM PSE COEF SE COEF SE
Constant 100.0 7.505 0.254 7.238 0.338 7.564 0.362 100.0 6.861 0.501 6.800 0.429 6.924 0.514
British Colony 99.9 -0.822 0.201 -0.695 0.232 -0.860 0.268 59.9 -0.254 0.274 -0.199 0.238 -0.483 0.266
Span./Port Colony 16.1 -0.026 0.118 - - -0.138 0.269 19.0 -0.040 0.155 - - -0.278 0.254
French Colony 12.8 0.015 0.122 - - 0.035 0.326 28.8 0.232 0.441 - - 0.452 0.387
Other Colonies 12.6 0.005 0.116 - - -0.019 0.350 13.4 -0.008 0.161 - - -0.211 0.407
Exec. Con. 1965-95 100.0 2.722 0.331 2.980 0.378 2.706 0.420 - - - - - - -
Exec. Con. 1985-95 - - - - - - - 100.0 2.981 0.510 3.052 0.456 3.079 0.550
Tropics 97.1 -0.701 0.265 - - -0.645 0.286 91.1 -0.680 0.335 - - -0.542 0.318
Ethnic Fractionalization 13.0 -0.016 0.169 -0.567 0.433 -0.077 0.464 24.4 -0.128 0.327 -0.868 0.437 -0.203 0.475
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32Table A1: Data Appendix
Variable Description
Delay in Schooling Following the methodology of Comin and Hobijn (2004), we construct historical data for primary
schooling enrollments, measured as the number of students in primary school as a fraction of
population between 5-14. Then using these data we create the delay in schooling variable, which
is the time the time it takes for each country to ﬁrst reach a threshold level in primary schooling
enrollment, minus the time it took the ﬁrst country to pass that threshold. Source: Mitchell (1998),
Banks (1999).
Initial Income Log of GDP per capita, where for the colonies we use the independence date or earliest available,
and for the non-colonies the average of earliest possible until 1831 (threshold for 50%). Source:
Maddison (2009).
Income in 1995 Log of GDP per capita 1995. Source: Maddison (2009).
Initial Schooling Primary schooling enrollments is based on authors’ calculations using historical schooling data.
For colonies we use the independence date (or earliest available if the independence not available).
For non-colonies, we use the earliest available. Source: Mitchell (1998), Banks (1999).
Schooling Logarithm of average years of male secondary and higher school attainment (25+), average for the
periods 1965- 1995 and 1985-1995. Source: Barro and Lee (2010).
Initial Executive Constraints Institutional variable with the lowest value 0 indicating unlimited executive authority and 1
executive parity or subordination. For the colonies we use the independence date or earliest
available, and for the non-colonies the average of earliest possible until 1831 (threshold for 50%).
Source: Polity IV.
Executive constraints Institutional variable with the lowest value 0 indicating unlimited executive authority and 1
executive parity or subordination, average for the periods 1965- 1995 and 1985-1995. Source:
Polity IV.
Auto Registration Number of passenger cars (excluding tractors and similar vehicles) in use. Numbers typically
derived from registration and licensing records, meaning that vehicles out of use may occasionally





Land Gini The gini coeﬃcient of the size distribution of land. For all countries we use the earliest observation
available. Source: Frankema (2009).
Arable Land Log of arable land (absolute) in hectares, in 1700. Source: Ramankutty and Foley (1999)
Independence Independence The time it takes for each country to declare independence relative to the United
States who declared independence in 1776. Source: CIA Factbook.
Tropics Percentage of land area classiﬁed as tropical and subtropical via the Koeppen-Geiger system.
Source: CID at Harvard.
Ethnic Fractionalization Variable which combines racial and linguistic characteristics. Source: Alesina, Devleeschauwer,
Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003).
Colonial Dummies Coded zero or one. One indicates that country was colonized by Britain, France, Spain or Portugal.
Source: CIA Factbook
Political Instability Political Instability is measured as the average of the ﬁrst diﬀerences (in absolute values) of the
Polity2 variable from Polity IV. The Polity2 variable is a measure of the degree of democracy in
a country with a score of +10 representing most democratic and -10 signifying most autocratic.
The averages of the ﬁrst diﬀerences are calculated as follows: for colonies we average values of the
(absolute) year-to-yearchanges in the Polity2 variable from the year of independence to the year the
colony achieves the schooling threshold, while for non-colonies, we take the corresponding average
values from the earliest available observation until the year the country achieves the schooling
threshold. Source: Polity IV.
Frecivil Coded zero or one. It indicates that a country was colonized by France, Spain, Belgium, Portugal
or Germany and French legal code was transferred. Source: La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1999).
Britcommon Coded zero or one. It indicates that a country was colonized by Britain and English legal code
was transferred. Source: La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999).
3
4Table A2: Robustness for Hazard Model for the Delay in Primary Schooling
The table presents partial estimates for the Cox-PH duration model based on model averaging for diﬀerent thresholds of primary schooling enrollment. The posterior
inclusion probability (PIP) of a variable is the sum of the posterior probabilities models that include that variable. The posterior mean (PM) is the average of the
partial likelihood coeﬃcient estimates (COEF) of individual models weighted by posterior probability. The posterior standard error (PSE) is the BMA estimate for
the standard error (SE) taking model uncertainty into account. All reported standard errors refer to heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
40% Threshold 45% Threshold 55% Threshold 60% Threshold
Variable PIP PM PSE PIP PM PSE PIP PM PSE PIP PM PSE
Initial Income 87.0 0.960 0.550 94.3 1.180 0.530 98.8 1.440 0.510 98.9 1.470 0.510
Land gini 70.5 -2.980 2.470 97.7 -5.750 2.010 52.4 -2.130 2.520 64.9 -3.170 2.940
Arable Land 56.6 -0.190 0.200 96.8 -0.420 0.160 56.0 -0.190 0.220 63.2 -0.290 0.280
British Colony 87.8 1.920 1.020 87.6 2.060 1.060 35.2 0.540 0.920 27.5 0.450 0.900
Span./Port. Colony 8.6 -0.030 0.180 12.7 -0.080 0.290 27.9 -0.260 0.540 26.9 -0.270 0.560
French Colony 8.1 0.070 0.360 11.8 0.140 0.500 15.6 0.200 0.730 18.0 0.270 0.890
Other Colonies 100.0 2.980 0.740 100.0 2.410 0.710 100.0 2.410 0.770 100.0 2.160 0.720
Independence 100.0 -0.020 0.010 100.0 -0.020 0.010 100.0 -0.020 0.010 99.5 -0.010 0.010
Political Instability 98.2 -1.550 0.640 98.8 -1.930 0.780 85.8 -1.670 1.050 66.2 -0.930 0.880
Initial Executive Constraints 25.7 0.310 0.660 34.1 0.470 0.820 52.9 0.750 0.870 62.1 0.980 0.950
Tropics 6.0 -0.010 0.130 14.0 -0.080 0.290 24.7 -0.220 0.470 33.8 -0.400 0.670
Ethnic Fractionalization 45.9 -0.670 0.900 47.9 -0.710 0.910 16.4 -0.160 0.480 20.5 -0.240 0.610
Auto Registration 6.1 -0.010 0.510 6.7 0.040 0.520 8.2 -0.100 0.650 4.8 -0.070 0.530
3
5